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INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION OF
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY AND
SECURITY
SIONA LISTOKIN*
ABSTRACT
Industry self-regulation of consumer data privacy and security has
been proposed as a flexible alternative and compliment to traditional
government regulation. This study analyzes whether different types of
existing industry-led standards improve online privacy and security.
This paper examines which types of firms join voluntary standards and
whether there is a difference in outcomes between trade association
memberships (like the Digital Advertising Alliance) and certification
programs (like TRUSTe). Results suggest that more trafficked websites
are more likely to adopt standards, and that trade association membership does not have an effect on privacy and security performance. This
article highlights the need for a valid privacy metric for robust empirical study of data privacy and security.
INTRODUCTION
As the creation and collection of consumer digital information continues its astonishing growth, consumer data privacy and security
stand out as pressing areas of opportunity and concern for the online
marketplace. In 2009 and 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
issued guidelines and best practices for self-regulation of consumer privacy and noted several industry-led initiatives covering the use of digital information that seek to foster innovation while protecting data privacy and security.1 Federal legislation proposals, such as the White
* Associate Professor, School of Policy, Government and International Affairs,
George Mason University, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, 703-993-9756,
slistoki@gmu.edu.
I am grateful for support from the George Mason Law School Law and Economics
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1. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY
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House’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, relies heavily on
“enforceable codes of conduct developed by diverse stakeholders,” that
would surely include industry organizations. 2
There are a number of advantages to self-regulation in fastchanging industries like “e-commerce” (broadly defined) that collect and
use consumer data. Information technology is fast-changing by nature
and regulatory responses may not keep pace with the industry. When
properly managed, self-regulation through trade associations and certification programs can adapt more quickly and appropriately to innovations than government regulation. Moreover, self-regulation can provide
a market solution to information asymmetries between firms and consumers by differentiating companies’ data privacy and security performance. Firms can use industry standards to increase consumer trust
without stifling the creation of new products or shifting away from a
free, advertising revenue-based business model. At the same time, selfregulation typically relies on self-policing for enforcement, creating conditions for adverse selection of firms that agree to comply with standards and moral hazard for firms once they are certified. Indeed, in May
2014, the FTC called for additional guidelines for “data brokers” to protect consumer privacy, in part, because monitoring and enforcement by
self-regulating organizations have not sufficiently addressed regulators’
concerns.3
This study analyzes whether different types of existing industry-led
standards for consumer data privacy and security effect online privacy.
This paper examines which types of firms adopt voluntary standards,
and whether there is a difference in outcomes between trade association
memberships (like the Digital Advertising Alliance) and certification
programs (like TRUSTe). Results suggest that more trafficked websites
are more likely to be members of standards programs, and that trade
association membership does not have an effect on privacy and security
performance. While there is some evidence that certification can hurt
PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: TRACKING TARGETING, AND
TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 FTC STAFF REPORT], available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staffreport-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf;
see generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Mar. 2012), available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissionreport-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
2. Alex Wilhelm, White House Drops ‘Consumer Privacy Bill Of Rights Act’ Draft,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2015), techcrunch.com/2015/02/27/white-house-drops-consumerprivacy-bill-of-rights-act-draft/.
3. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY, i-ix (May 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-tradecommission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
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subsequent privacy and security compared to similar non-certified websites, this result is sensitive to the privacy metric used.
This study contributes to a fairly sparse literature that evaluates
the effects of membership in voluntary consumer data privacy standards. The paper also compares existing measures of online privacy and
highlights the significant challenges in building a valid privacy metric.
Measures of website privacy that have been used in prior studies to
evaluate the market for privacy frequently diverge and/or cover different websites, and empirical studies like this one may be highly sensitive
to the choice of construct. The issues examined in this paper highlight
the need for more rigorous empirical study and practical knowledge
about different self-regulatory options in consumer data privacy.
PRIOR LITERATURE
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY SELF-REGULATION
There are a number of studies that examine self-regulation in consumer data privacy. Scholars have introduced frameworks for viable
self-regulation in this area.4 This literature considers self-regulation as
a middle ground between a pure market model and government regulation, including industry trade associations and third-party certification.
Self-regulation, or industry regulation, can create rules, play a role in
enforcement, and be involved in adjudication.5 Analytical models consider consumers with heterogeneous preferences for privacy and noisy
signals from firms as to privacy risk.6 Self-regulation (or seal of approval programs) can enhance trust in situations of isolated encounters, and
may be a more efficient regime than mandatory regulation.
Empirical work in this area presents a mixed picture regarding the
efficacy of industry regulation. In 2000, a study of self-regulation via
website privacy notices noted that one-third of the sample websites did
not post privacy policies and only 14% of those that did were compre-

4. See generally Priscilla M. Regan, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995); see generally Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation,
and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 9 (Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. 1997); see
generally Zhulei Tang, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu & Michael D. Smith, Gaining Trust Through
Online Privacy Protection: Self-Regulation, Mandatory Standards, or Caveat Emptor, 24
J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 153 (2008), available at http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=heinzworks; Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Many
Failures: A Brief History of Privacy Self-Regulation in the United States, WORLD PRIVACY
F. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/
WPFselfregulationhistory.pdf.
5. Swire, supra note 5 at 10.
6. Tang et al., supra note 5 at 7-8.
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hensive.7 Subsequent works in this area show an increase in the existence of posted policies and variability in the content and readability of
these privacy notices.8 Other studies analyze specific industry membership associations or certifications. Descriptive studies that examine the
content of the rules or enforcement mechanisms are typically skeptical,
though there are exceptions.9 For example, Villafranco and Riley are
generally positive about the industry rules of Network Advertising Initiative (“NAI”).10 A survey of consumers showed that only 11% of users
understand the NAI opt-out initiative.11
I examine two different voluntary programs, TRUSTe (a third party
certification) and the DAA (an industry association). There are a few
notable studies that specifically test the efficacy of DAA membership or
TRUSTe certification beyond the case studies and review of standards
highlighted above. Komanduri et al. examine the cookies produced by
the DAA and NAI opt-out mechanisms of the top 100 websites and find
numerous instances of non-compliance.12 In addition, Edelman shows
that TRUSTe certified websites are more likely to be rated as untrustworthy, suggesting there is an adverse selection effect for the certification seal.13 Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy compare 60 websites’ privacy
policies and find that TRUSTe certification does not improve the content of privacy policies.14
7. Mary J. Culnan, Protecting Privacy Online: Is Self-Regulation Working?, 19 J.
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 20, 20 (2000), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable
/30000484?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
8. See generally, George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan & Henry Greene, A Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy Notice Readability, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 238
(2006) (analyzing the readability of over 300 online privacy notices).
9. See generally Robert Gellman, TrustE Fails to Justify Its Role As Privacy Arbiter, 7 PRIVACY L. & POL’Y REP. 118 (2000); See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and
Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 439 (2011); See generally Saranga Komanduri, Richard Shay, Greg Norcie, Blase Ur
& Lorrie Faith Cranor, AdChoices? Compliance with Online Behavioral Advertising Notice and Choice Requirements, 7 ISJLP 603 (2012).
10. See generally John E. Villafranco & Katherine E. Riley, So You Want to SelfRegulate? The National Advertising Division as Standard Bearer, 27 ANTITRUST 79
(2013).
11. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Americans' Attitudes About Internet Behavioral Advertising Practices, in WPES ’10: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH ANNUAL
ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOCIETY at 1 (2010), available at
http://aleecia.com/authors-drafts/tprc-behav-AV.pdf.
12. Komanduri et al., supra note 10 at 12.
13. Benjamin Edelman, Adverse Selection in Online “Trust” Certifications and
Search Results, 10 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 17, 1 (2011), available at
http://www.benedelman.org/publications/advsel-trust-draft.pdf.
14. See generally Anthony D. Miyazaki & Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Internet Seals
of Approval: Effects on Online Privacy Policies and Consumer Perceptions, 36 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 28 (2002), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.105.5648&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
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While there are relatively few empirical evaluations of industry
self-regulation of consumer data privacy, there are multiple studies of
voluntary standards in other industries.15 Studies on self-regulation and
third party certification in the financial, environmental, healthcare,
food and other industries find mixed results as to the efficacy of selfregulation.16
Voluntary standards may serve as differentiating tools for consumers and regulators that indicate superior firm management and processes designed to protect data security or control privacy. 17 Industry
association membership or certification can improve certain outcomes
through informal information exchange and industry pressure. Industry
associations frequently facilitate communication between members and
regulators, and may host member conferences to disseminate research
to firms. For example, the Digital Advertising Alliance calls for transparency about data collection, and clarifies the practical application of
this principle through published cases on enhanced notice to consumers.18 “Mimetic forces” such as social networks, the creation of guidelines and best practices can lead to compliance even in the absence of
sanctions.19

Hypothesis 1. Members of consumer data industry associations or
websites have better privacy and security than non-members.
While both industry associations and third-party certifications
share many characteristics conducive to effective private governance,
there are a number of key differences between these models. Trade associations typically exist as self-organized institutions designed to create collective governance structures and have incentives to establish
standards and behave as a “middle ground” between traditional government regulation and the free market.20 Thus, industry organizations
15. See generally VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001).
16. See generally B. James Deaton, A Theoretical Framework for Examining the
Role of Third-Party Certifiers, 15 FOOD CONTROL 615, 615-19 (2004); see generally Gilles
Hilary & Clive Lennox, The Credibility of Self-Regulation: Evidence from the Accounting
Profession’s Peer Review Program, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 211 (2005); see generally Andrew
A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical
Industry's Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698 (2000).
17. See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973);
Michael W. Toffel, Resolving Information Asymmetries in Markets: The Role of Certified
Management Programs at 2 (University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper Series,
Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9qh5r011.
ity,’

18.

Reminder: Enhanced Notice and Choice to Consumers is a ‘Shared Responsibil-

DIGITAL
ADVER.
ALLIANCE
BLOG
(Nov.
17,
2014),
http://www.digitaladvertisingalliance.org/blog.aspx?id=11-17-14.
19. King & Lenox, supra note 17 at 701-02.
20. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
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are motivated to create standards that are sufficiently restrictive to
avoid external threats like government regulation and enhance their
members’ profiles with policymakers.
Certification organizations do not necessarily share this common
goal with their clients.21 In order for third party certifications or seals of
approval to convey a credible signal of quality, they must be independent from those seeking the certification. There is little near-term incentive for for-profit certifiers to restrict their membership.22 In addition,
certified websites are not integral to – and may not even be involved in
– the creation of certification standards as they are in industry associations. It is plausible that within the same industry, trade or industryled associations may have different impacts than certifications.

Hypothesis 2. Paid privacy certifications (seals) do not improve privacy
performance.
DATA
My sample includes the top 10,000 trafficked websites in 2015 that
existed in 2007 and 2010. I lose about 100 websites that did not have
industry information. Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. Website traffic is an imperfect screening technique for the population of
comparison sites for DAA membership or TRUSTe certification. For example, the DAA includes a number of advertising network companies
that do not draw much traffic. Thus, only 1% of the websites in my
sample are members of the DAA in 2015, and about 4% of the websites
are TRUSTe certified despite larger member rolls. 23

DAA AND TRUSTE
TRUSTe is a private data privacy management company, with
thousands of certified firms as customers. 24 TRUSTe sells software that
provides a data privacy management platform and provides assessments and certification for over 4,000 firms that meet the program requirements.25 The certification is primarily concerned with transparency and consumer choice, and includes the requirement that firms
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, 29, 33 (1990).
21. See Miyazaki & Krishnamurthy, supra note 15 at 22-23.
22. See Bob Tanner, Independent Assessment by Third-Party Certification Bodies,
11 FOOD CONTROL 415, 415-17 (2000) (on file with author).
23. The sample is also screened for websites that exclusively carry adult content.
24. About TRUSTe, TRUSTe, https://www.truste.com/about-truste/ (last visited Oct.
7, 2015).

25.

Id.
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implement commercially reasonable protections for data security. 26
It is worth noting that one of the TRUSTe programs (“TRUSTed
Data”) bases its requirements, in part, on the FTC self-regulatory principles, the NAI principles and the DAA principles. 27 While the TRUSTe
certification provides specific monitoring guidelines, it is not clear how
it deals with non-compliance. The seal requires annual recertification,
and the consumer dispute resolution service processes thousands of
consumer complaints every year. In 2014, the FTC charged that
TRUSTe failed to follow its guidelines for privacy seal recertifications in
over 1,000 incidences between 2006 and 2013; TRUSTe eventually settled with the FTC.28
The Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) is a non-profit organization
made up of marketing and advertising industry associations that seeks
to provide self-regulatory consumer privacy principles for internet
based advertising.29 The DAA is one of the most prominent selfregulation associations in consumer data privacy and security, but has
been criticized for promoting weak data privacy programs and enforcement.30
The DAA was established in 2009 by several U.S. advertising associations, following the release of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report on “Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising.” 31
It is led by the Association of National Advertisers, The American Advertising Federation, 4A’s, Network Advertising Initiative, Direct Marketing Association and Interactive Advertising Bureau.32 Originally,
participating companies consisted of advertisers and third party analytics companies, but starting in 2011, DAA expanded its efforts to include
social networks and non-advertising firms Enforcement is handled by
the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) and the Council for Better
Business Bureau (CBBB).33
26. Certification Standards, TRUSTe, https://www.truste.com/privacy-certificationstandards/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
27. TRUSTed
Data
Privacy
Certifications,
TRUSTe,
https://www.truste.com/business-products/trusted-data/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
28. TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges it Deceived Consumers Through Its Privacy Seal
Program, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (NOV. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-throughits.
29. Pedro G. Leon, Justin Cranshaw, Lorrie F. Cranor, Jim Graves, Monoj Hastak,
Blase Ur, & Guzi Xu, What Do Online Behavioral Advertising Disclosures Communicate
to Others, 12 (April 13, 2012), https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports
/CMUCyLab12008.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.; 2009 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2.
32. Leon et al., supra note 30 at 2.
33. Enforcement, DIGITAL ADVERT ALLIANCE, http://www.digitaladvertisingalliance
.org/content.aspx?page=enforcement (last visited on Oct. 7, 2015).
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PRIVACY METRICS
The choice of privacy metric is crucial to this study and other articles that attempt to evaluate website privacy and security. While researching website privacy and security performance, I came across a
number of potential measures, including some that have been used in
other research. Some of these measures are included in the summary
statistics and briefly described in Table 2.34
I use two measures of privacy and security, TrustGauge and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse data breach records. The strengths and weaknesses of these measures are discussed below.
TrustGauge is an index that measures a 10-point “trust score”
based on a number of different website factors.35 The index is not meant
to exclusively or comprehensively measure privacy; it is more a construct of trustworthiness or validity. 36 Nonetheless, the measure is
based in part on website privacy policies and security. The first set of
features is focused on website content and verifiability, and scores sites
based on the availability of contact information, privacy statements and
verified customer service response. The second group of factors concerns
security, such as using secure protocols on billing pages. A final set of
features measures third party certification and website traffic. I subtract the points allotted for TRUSTe certification for any certified websites (no points are added for DAA membership) but do not adjust
scores for website rank. As a result, I expect larger websites to have
higher scores by design, and I must control for the traffic rank. I use a
dummy that equals one for websites that score above 5 (the midway
point). I have two full years of TrustGauge data (2007 and 2015) for the
top 10,000 ranked websites in either year and a partial sample for 2010.
In 2015, only 6% of the websites in my sample are coded as untrustworthy (down from about 11% in 2007).
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) is a California nonprofit organization that has collected information about reported data breaches
since 2005.37 Data breaches are a particular element of data privacy and
security. A reported breach, or absence of a breach is not necessarily an
indication of underlying security weakness. In addition, the breaches
reported appear to be heavily concentrated among the most trafficked
websites and firms. Most breaches included in their data involve social
34. Of course, many potential measures are not included in this table. Notable absences include the Web of Trust (WOT), MSCI Privacy Index, EFF’s Who Has Your Back?,
and Terms of Service; Didn’t Read. These alternatives either don’t cover enough websites,
are relatively new and unknown, or are very similar to the metrics included in the paper.
35. About The Company, TRUSTGAUGE, http://www.trustgauge.com/about.html (last
visited on Oct. 7, 2015).
36. Id.
37 Chronology of Data Breaches Security Breaches 2005-Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, (April 20, 2005), https://www.privacyrights.org/node/1398.
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security numbers, account numbers and other sensitive information.
The PRC collects the total number of records that were compromised in
each breach, however this number is “unknown” for many of the observations. In addition, the number of breached records may not be a proper indication of the lack of data security. For example, a substantial
breach in Sony Pictures Entertainment in late 2014 records only 47,000
compromised records (as compared to 101.6 million records in a 2011
breach of the PlayStation Network and Sony Online Entertainment). 38
Unfortunately, these data are not consistently reported, and I create a
measure based solely on the existence of a reported breach. I restrict
the PRC data to non-governmental or educational targets and create a
cumulative dummy each year for having ever been breached (i.e. the
2015 dummy will be 1 if the website has had at least one breach since
2005). Less than 1% of websites report more than one breach over the
time period. About 2.5% of the websites in my sample have had a reported data breach by 2015.
Considering that neither TrustGauge nor PRC were created as
measures of data privacy or security, it is worth comparing these constructs to other existing indices. I test the correlations between TrustGauge and the data breach records as a check of their legitimacy. The
correlation table of privacy measures in 2015 is shown in Table 3.
Frankly, the results are discouraging, and potentially consequential for
the broader research area that evaluates data privacy. Pairwise spearman correlations are fairly low (and sometimes negative) and generally
not significant. TrustGauge and breach records do not have a particularly strong (or weak) correlation to other measures. I use these metrics
because of the availability of past data. The inconsistencies between the
two, and the lack of convergence among privacy measures are major
limitations of empirical study in this area. While other measures may
prove to be stronger with time, TrustGauge and PRC have a relatively
long history and cover a range of websites and companies.
I also collect information on website traffic rank and industry, from
a well-known web traffic site, ranking.com.
RESULTS
My empirical strategy is to test differences in privacy outcomes for
member/certified sites over time, and to refine the validity of these
comparisons to approach the counterfactual: how would these websites
perform without membership or certification? I begin by comparing av38 Andrew Gertz, 2014 Data Breaches by the Numbers (and the Impact), SAFENET,
(Febuary 12, 2015), data-protection.safenet-inc.com/2015/02/2014-data-breaches-by-thenumbers-and-the-impact/; Christopher M. Loeffler, UK ICO fines Sony £250,000 after
2011 data breach, LEXOLOGY, (January 31, 2013), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g
=417f1536-a83e-4f82-8d11-52145f0a9bd6.
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erage privacy performance of members to non-members, and then restrict the sample to the most trafficked websites in order to control for
the effects of site size. Finally, I match certified websites to uncertified
website and employ a difference-in-differences approach to help differentiate between selection and treatment effects of membership/certification.
Initial t-tests of privacy and security show that both DAA members
and TRUSTe certified websites are more likely to be rated highly by
TrustGauge, and that this difference is significant (Table 4). This result
supports hypothesis 1. At the same time, these websites are also more
likely to have experienced a data breach.
In order to examine whether these differences persist over time and
across different types of websites, I test the difference in privacy performance in both 2007 and 2015. These results are shown graphically in
Figures 1 and 2 for DAA membership and TRUSTe certification, respectively. Column 1 in both figures show the likelihood of being well-rated
by TrustGauge and of having a reported data breach in both time periods along with 95% confidence intervals, for the full sample of websites
in the study. For the most part, the mixed results suggested by the initial t-tests persist. Member/certified sites are significantly more likely
to be rated trustworthy in 2007, though this gap shrinks by 2015. These
same websites are also more likely to have been breached by 2007; this
difference actually grows larger by 2015.39
However, further tests suggest that many of these differences are
related to website traffic. Column 2 of Figures 1 and 2 show the same ttests over time for only the top 500 trafficked websites. The results are
quite different; DAA members are essentially indistinguishable from
non-members in terms of TrustGauge and breaches. TRUSTe certification is similarly not a differentiator by 2015, though the 2007 gaps remain.
To better control for the effects of size and other factors, I use a difference-in-differences approach. I match member/certified websites to a
control group of non-certified sites and compare the difference in privacy outcomes in 2015 and 2007 (the difference between certified and noncertified websites in 2015 minus the difference between certified and
non-certified websites in 2007). The matching step is intended to provide the counterfactual for how websites would have performed if they
had not been certified, by eliminating time-constant unobserved effects
39 The set of firms that are certified or members differs between 2007 and 2015.
Websites both join and dropout of certification. The t-test results shown in figures 1 and 2
remain almost exactly the same if I restrict the sample to websites that are consistent
members, or if only compare sites that dropout. Given the subsequent results shown in
this section, this is further confirmation that certification – at any point – is correlated
with other factors that impact privacy and security.
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on outcomes. I use propensity score matching to create better control
websites that have the same probability of being certified based on website traffic rank and industry in 2007.40
The difference-in-differences approach typically runs across a preand post-treatment period. Since both DAA membership and TRUSTe
certification pre-date 2007, however, I do not have a strict “pretreatment” observation. I therefore run two tests with different treatment groups. In model A, treated websites are those that were members/certified in both 2007 and 2015. “Consistent” membership cuts the
number of certified sites for both DAA and TRUSTe to 25 and 58 websites, respectively. Model B models a pre- and post-treatment by restricting certification to those sites that were not initially certified in
2007, but were certified by 2015.
Figure 3 shows the propensity score for model A certified and noncertified sites before and after matching for both DAA and TRUSTe. Results are similar for model B. In both cases, the certified sites are quite
different insofar as propensity scores than the full sample of noncertified sites; the match improves the comparison considerably.
The difference-in-differences results are shown in Table 5. The first
four columns show the results for DAA membership, using TrustGauge
and breaches as the outcome variables for both models A and B. The
certification dummy shows the difference in TrustGauge/breach averages in 2015 minus the difference in TrustGauge/breach in 2007. For the
most part, the results are not significant, suggesting that trade association membership does not impact privacy. TRUSTe has a negative impact on privacy and security, though these results are not consistent
across all models. Subsequent to TRUSTe certification, websites are
almost 5% less likely to be rated to trustworthy compared to the trend
among non-certified sites (column 6). However, this result only holds for
model B, suggesting that there is an unobserved difference between
websites that were certified in 2007 to those that subsequently became
certified. Certification also increases the likelihood of having been
breached by 2015 compared to the trend of the control websites (columns 7 and 8). These results support hypothesis 2, that paid certifications do not improve privacy.
DISCUSSION
This study evaluates industry self-regulation and paid certification
of data privacy and security. Overall, the results suggest that the populations of websites that join industry associations or get certified are
different than those that do not: they are simultaneously more trust40 See Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity
Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41, 1 (1983), available
at http://biomet.oxfordjournals.org/content/70/1/41.full.pdf+html.
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worthy and more likely to have had a reported data breach. However,
industry association membership does not appear to improve the likelihood of being trustworthy or secure. I find some evidence that the paid
certification seal TRUSTe actually hurts performance compared to similar non-certified sites, as measured by TrustGauge and PRC. These results extend a similar study that finds TRUSTe certified sites are less
trustworthy.41
As discussed previously, the privacy and security metrics used in
this study are imperfect, and are not available for a true longitudinal
study. Identifying an accurate measure of data privacy and security
performance is difficult, and this work demonstrates that many existing
metrics diverge and cover different populations of websites. The lack of
convergence in the measures may undermine implications I would draw
from this current study. More importantly, the inconsistency of privacy
metrics has implications for the “economics of privacy” field. Empirical
tests of privacy markets frequently require independent assessments of
website privacy, and the construct validity of existing metrics is suspect. This is a developing area, and new measures are still being created. At the very least, the strength of privacy measures is an area ripe
for future research.
With the above caveat in mind, the current results have implications for websites, policymakers and users. Industry associations, like
the DAA, are meant to generate a set of best practices and to communicate with policymakers. DAA membership does not have a discernible
impact on privacy performance as measured by TrustGauge. It is also
possible that the DAA does improve privacy performance or the regulatory environment, but these benefits are not exclusive to members and
thus fail to differentiate members from non-members. DAA could therefore facilitate industry self-regulation without confining those results to
its small membership group. Paid certifications like TRUSTe may provide process management benefits, but there is no evidence in this
study that its seals improve outcomes (in fact, outcomes appear to suffer). This result is in line with the FTC’s complaint that TRUSTe did
not perform recertifications as promised for years.
In general, the study highlights the relative dearth of empirical
evaluations of certification programs and self-regulation of data privacy. Further research is needed to create a more nuanced picture of website privacy and security performance. The need for practical assessments of privacy will grow as the public and government, specifically
FTC, continue to consider data privacy as a product subject to contract,
transaction and fair treatment. This study outlines a research strategy
to evaluate website privacy and certifications across different contexts
going forward.
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